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ABSTRACT
One common practice in relation to alphanumeric passwords
is to write them down or share them with a trusted friend or
colleague. Graphical password schemes often claim the ad-
vantage that they are significantly more secure with respect
to both verbal disclosure and writing down. We investigated
the reality of this claim in relation to the Passfaces graphi-
cal password scheme. By collecting a corpus of naturalistic
descriptions of a set of 45 faces, we explored participants’
ability to associate descriptions with faces across three con-
ditions in which the decoy faces were selected: (1) at ran-
dom; (2) on the basis of their visual similarity to the target
face; and (3) on the basis of the similarity of the verbal de-
scriptions of the decoy faces to the target face. Participants
were found to perform significantly worse when presented
with visual and verbally grouped decoys, suggesting that
Passfaces can be further secured for description. Subtle dif-
ferences in both the nature of male and female descriptions,
and male and female performance were also observed.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.1.2 [User/Machine Systems]; D.4.6 [Security and Pro-
tection]
General Terms
Security, Human Factors
Keywords
Graphical Passwords, Passfaces, Description
1. INTRODUCTION
The fundamental requirement of knowledge-based authen-
tication is that knowledge of the authentication secret must
stay private. Conventional advice aiming to reduce the likeli-
hood of unauthorised access urges users to select distinct and
hard to guess passwords for each separate account that they
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own. User compliance, requires a feat of human memory
that flies in the face of the limits of human cognition. Tech-
niques users can adopt for memorising these seemingly un-
memorable passwords include mnemonics [29] and passphrases
[16], while alternative approaches to passwords include cog-
nitive [30] and associative passwords [23]. Technical solu-
tions to the problem also exist in the form of Single Sign-
on (SSO) password managers [4]. Despite this, in many
security-sensitive contexts it has been found that for rea-
sons of both perceived convenience and necessity, users often
write down their alphanumeric passwords and share them
with others.
1.1 Password practices
The fact that a typical user has a significant number of
passwords to remember, and copes with this by recording
passwords externally, has been demonstrated in a number
of studies. Adams and Sasse [1] suggest that 4-5 regularly
used passwords per user should be considered a maximum;
one study [22] estimates the number of passwords per user
to be 6 while a survey of BT employees [20] suggests this
number is as high as 16.
Adams and Sasse also report that at least 50% of par-
ticipants in a survey of 139 wrote down passwords as a re-
sult of the difficulty of remembering multiple passwords and
responding to password expiration policies. More resound-
ingly two-thirds of respondants in a survey of 300 corporate
users wrote down work-related passwords [21]. The same
study also uncovered that 66% of workers admitting giving
their password to a colleague, and 74% knew one or more
passwords belonging to a co-worker. To a much lesser ex-
tent Zviran and Haga [31] report 7% of users successfully
recalling self-generated passwords in their user study wrote
them down to aid memorability, despite being instructed
to the contrary. This figure increased to 9% for recalling
passphrases.
Although communicating personal passwords to others in
a corporate setting can seldom be considered secure, recent
discussions as to the risks of writing down and sharing pass-
words have been moderated by an awareness of the need
to take into account the realities of different work contexts
(e.g. that different settings pose different levels of threat and
risk). In an appropriate setting, and when carried out re-
sponsibly, writing down and even sharing passwords can be
a practical and effective solution to the password manage-
ment problem (e.g. providing a readily accessible back-up if
a user forgets a password).
1.2 Password description
Graphical passwords are thought to be particularly resis-
tant to being written down or verbally communicated. That
users will find it difficult to share graphical secrets is a widely
held assumption, and an implicit (though untested) design
feature of most graphical password schemes. That graphi-
cal passwords are more memorable than their alphanumeric
counterparts means that users are less likely to need to
record their secrets as a memory aid. However, were graph-
ical passwords to become widely used, users would be pre-
sented with exactly the same password management prob-
lem as for alphanumeric passwords. In such situations, users
would be likely to attempt to adopt the same strategies as
for alphanumeric schemes, that is, record the password ex-
ternally or communicate it to a trusted friend or colleague.
In relation to graphical passwords, the nature of users’
descriptions of graphical secrets, and the vulnerability of
password schemes to description, have not been previously
explored. In this paper we evaluate description in relation
to the Passfaces graphical password scheme. The work com-
prises three steps, firstly we collect sets of naturalistic de-
scriptions of faces. For these faces we analyse both the sim-
ilarity of the verbal descriptions, and users’ judgements as
to their visual similarity. We then evaluate people’s abil-
ity to authenticate themselves using a verbal description of
a Passfaces password and demonstrate that by systematic
organisation of the decoy faces, Passfaces can be made con-
siderably less vulnerable to description.
Unlike alphanumeric passwords, most secrets for graphi-
cal password schemes can neither be precisely written down
using a static media (e.g. pen and paper) nor verbally com-
municated. Users therefore have to revert to the production
of a written or spoken description of their secret. Though
our interest here is in graphical passwords, we define pass-
word description as any non-digital attempt to record or
communicate a password, using either an external repre-
sentation or verbal/non-verbal means. This encompasses
sketches, written and spoken descriptions and instructions,
and even accompanying physical gestures.
Technologies to facilitate the sharing of graphical pass-
words clearly exist; given the ubiquity of camera phones,
these provide an obvious and familiar way to record im-
ages in recognition-based schemes. However we believe that
despite the onset of digital devices providing connectivity
anywhere, anytime; there will still be occasions when de-
scription is the only means of sharing a graphical password.
Description itself is a phenomenon of some interest given
the widely held assumptions related to Passfaces and other
graphical schemes.
One claimed advantage of the Passfaces scheme over con-
ventional alphanumeric passwords is that Passfaces “can’t
be written down or copied” and “can’t be given to another
person” ([18], p. 3). A number of subtle configurations have
been adopted to mitigate against the risk of easy description,
such as that “the grids of faces in Passfaces are grouped by
sex and are selected to be equally distinctive so that Pass-
faces cannot be described by gender or obvious characteris-
tics. None of the faces stand out from the others” ([18], p. 5)
and that Passfaces can be used in“grayscale on all platforms
in order to make it even harder for a user to describe their
Passfaces to someone else” ([18], p. 4).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: firstly we dis-
cuss password description then give a short review of related
work in the field of graphical passwords. Then we introduce
the design of our user study and the two phases involved:
(1) description collection and (2) login. We conclude with
a discussion of the results of the study and some closing
remarks.
2. GRAPHICAL PASSWORDS
The term graphical password was introduced by Blonder
[2] in a click-based scheme in which the user was required
to choose a sequence of pre-defined click regions in an im-
age. Passpoints [28] extended Blonder’s original proposal
by allowing users to select any location in the image as a
click-point bounded by a tolerance region. Having user de-
fined click-points significantly increases the password space.
Passpoints continues to receive considerable attention from
researchers, most recently in relation to vulnerabilities aris-
ing from structural aspects of visual perception. For exam-
ple, that user selection of click-points is biased by so-called
hotspots. Incorporating such insights within a graphical at-
tack dictionary has been performed using image processing
techniques to acquire salient points [10], and using corpus-
based approaches by harvesting click-points from a small
population of users [25].
Passfaces [19] is a commercial graphical password scheme,
for which the vulnerability and usability has been relatively
under explored. Brostoff and Sasse [3] conducted an eval-
uation of the system in a field study that found that par-
ticipants using Passfaces experienced one third of the login
errors of alphanumeric password users, despite accessing the
system less frequently. Other unpublished evaluations con-
ducted by Valentine [27, 26] discovered that users had low
expectations that they would remember passfaces over a long
period of time. Amongst other issues, participants felt that
due to the apparent difficulty of writing down their pass-
faces they had no strategy in relation to forgetting (i.e. they
had a commonsense awareness of the difficulty of writing
down their passfaces). Valentine found that users’ memory
for passfaces was significantly better than for conventional
passwords.
A number of interesting trends as to users’ choices of im-
ages emerged in a study of the Face system [6] in which users
are allowed to choose the faces that made up their graphical
password. Users were found to consistently choose attrac-
tive faces of a different sex, but of the same racial group, as
themselves. Male users exhibited this behavior to a greater
degree, although it should be noted that such sex differences
are notoriously subject to large individual differences.
Other applications of faces in security and privacy systems
have emerged in recent years. The creator of Passfaces has
patented a method of using faces to facilitate PIN recall by
creating an intuitive mapping between faces and PIN dig-
its [5]. A small study has suggested that this FacePIN has
potential to be a usable solution to the PIN memorability
problem [12]. Similarly, Facemail [17] employs faces to vi-
sualize recipients of email for the sender, aiming to avoid
embarrassing mistakes of sending personal communications
to mailing lists or the wrong recipient. Xu, Zhu and Owen
[24] present a recent survey of graphical password schemes.
3. USER STUDY
We designed a user study that simulated a Passfaces lo-
gin, comprising 5 face grids in a 3×3 formation. A total of
Figure 1: The Passfaces challenge for the description
study. Participants were required to select the face
to which an audio description refers. Participants
were free to use the on-screen controls to replay au-
dio descriptions.
45 faces were collected from the Passfaces online demo (27
female and 18 male), enough for 3 grids of female faces and
2 grids of male faces. Rather than assigning Passfaces to
participants in the usual way, at the presentation of each
of the 5 grids an audio description of one of the faces (the
target face) was played. Participants were required to click
the face which they believed was being described. So to ‘lo-
gin’ successfully a participant had to match each of the 5
spoken descriptions with the corresponding face in the grid.
In the experiment our goal was to explore the scenario of
the participant receiving a description of a sequence of pass-
faces to login to a resource on behalf of a colleague. Our
objective was to study three aspects of Passfaces in relation
to description:
1. to quantify Passfaces’ vulnerability to description;
2. to evaluate approaches to reduce its vulnerability to
description through the choice of decoy faces;
3. to explore whether there are any significant sex differ-
ences in relation to creating and interpreting descrip-
tions of Passfaces.
Our attempts to decrease the vulnerability of Passfaces to
description centred around the procedure by which decoys
were selected for a given target face. Though the exact pro-
cedure by which decoy selection is undertaken in the com-
mercial Passfaces system is not known to us, we explored
three conditions, each corresponding to a different decoy
selection procedure: (1) random selection (of faces of the
same sex); (2) selection based on independent judgments of
the visual similarity of the decoys to the target face; and (3)
selection based of the similarity of the verbal descriptions of
the faces to the target face.
In the description collection phase (section 3.1) we discov-
ered a significant difference in the duration of the descrip-
tions between males and females, an effect suggested by the
psycholinguistic literature. Discussions of cognitive gender
differences are the subject of ongoing controversy, however,
there are three widely accepted differences: linguistic abil-
ity, visuo-spatial ability, and perceptual-motor ability [13].
The term linguistic ability encompasses but is not limited
to: verbal fluency, grammar, writing, and vocabulary. In
relation to password description, differences in terms of lin-
guistic ability are particularly relevant. These appear early
(developmentally) though it is not clear if these differences
are maintained into old age [13].
A study by Huttenlocher et al. [14] revealed that on av-
erage there is a 16 word difference in vocabulary between
females and males at 13 months, increasing to 51 words at
20 months and and 115 at 24 months. Horgan [11] discov-
ered that females between 2 and 4 years old used longer
utterances at a younger age than males, also showing more
linguistic maturity by demonstrating ability with the pas-
sive voice, participles and adjectives. Halpern [13] presents
a summary of the complex yet compelling topic of gender
differences in cognitive ability.
Such results from gender difference research suggest that
females could perform better at articulating descriptions of
their Passfaces to a friend. As well as this expectation, it
is interesting to consider the effectiveness of females when
using descriptions from male counterparts and vice-versa.
One of the key ingredients of effective communication (and
thereby description) is a shared and subtle understanding of
any vocabulary used, yet potentially males and females are
subject to quite different cultural influences.
3.1 Description collection procedure
The first stage of the user study was to collect descriptions
for a bank of 45 faces. We recruited 18 contributors, 9 male
and 9 female, each of whom recorded verbal descriptions of
15 random faces, providing us with 6 descriptions per face,
3 male and 3 female. The average age of contributors was
26 (standard deviation of 8) and as shown in figure 2 there
was some variation in their background. Although computer
scientists dominated, there was an approximately even split
between computing science and mathematics on one hand,
and arts and humanities on the other.
The recordings took place in a recording studio at New-
castle University; a quiet environment free of distractions.
Contributors were given a digital recorder and a set of faces
to describe. Faces were presented on a sheet of paper with
each face sized 3cm × 4cm. Contributors were asked to ex-
amine each face and record a description in their own time,
that is, using as much time as they required both in prepa-
ration for and during the recording. No advice was given
on how to approach the descriptions, other than that con-
tributors were asked to imagine the scenario that they were
describing faces to a friend.
Contributors were left alone in the studio and afterwards
the recordings were assessed in terms of the sound quality.
In two cases it was deemed that the quality of the record-
ings were not high enough to be used in the subsequent
study (due to not holding the microphone close enough to
the mouth) and two new contributors were recruited. The
classification in figure 2 includes only contributors whose de-
scriptions were actually used. We allowed elements of hes-
itation in the recording, although no examples of this were
found to be detrimental to the quality of the description.
Number of participants
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Computing Science
English
Music
Mathematics
Law
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3.2 Approaches to description
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“Long, red brown hair, parting in the middle.
Uhm <break> happy girl.”
“Okay, female, smiling. Uhm, Caucasian I would
guess. Slightly longer than shoulder length reddy
brown hair. Dark reddy brown hair. Dark eyes.
Uhm, not think not fat, average sort of, uhm,
chubbiness. Uhm, slightly pointed chin. Slightly
odd looking smile. Uhm, quite big hair, straight
again, or slightly curly.”
“Sort of late 20’s, uhm, white girl with long brown
hair. Looks a bit like Kate Winslet.”
Though these are all descriptions of the target face, as-
pects of each do describe other faces.
3.3.2 Visual groups
Decoys in the visual groups condition were selected based
on their visual similarity to the target face. To gain a con-
sensus on which faces looked similar, we recruited a second
group of contributors (similarity judges), whose similarity
rankings were used in the selection of 8 visually similar de-
coys for each target face. These volunteers were recruited
in computer labs around Newcastle University campus and
each was assigned 5 faces out of our bank of 45. For of
these 5 faces they were asked to select as many other faces
as possible that were lookalikes.
Typically contributors selected 6 or 7 though some were
assigned more faces, depending on their perceived difficulty
of the task and contributor responses were recorded by an
experiment moderator. Upon gathering enough data we
manually looked through the results for any agreement be-
tween participant choices of lookalikes so as to create a set
of 8 decoys for each face. Where it was not possible to se-
lect 8 decoys for a particular face based on the similarity
judgements alone (i.e. an insufficient number of faces had
been identified as similar) we manually selected the short-
fall based on our own judgement of similarity. At most only
2 decoys were selected at any one time using this ad hoc
technique.
Figure 4 shows the visually similar grid assembled for the
same target face highlighted in figure 3. Many of the ele-
ments of the sample descriptions presented in section 3.3.1
apply to these faces. As expected the visual similarity of the
members of the visual group is readily apparent.
Figure 4: Visual groups: a grid of faces grouped by
visual similarity (the target face is highlighted).
3.3.3 Verbal groups
The decoys in verbal groups were selected based on the
similarity of the verbal descriptions to the target face. Two
descriptions were deemed similar if the same features were
emphasised and similar values used to describe those fea-
tures. We developed a systematic way to construct these
groupings based on the set of 250 descriptions. The first
step was to manually transcribe each collected description,
and use the TextSTAT concordance software to collate key
terms used about each face. By looking at the common de-
scriptive terms arising in the descriptions we identified the
following features the contributors were most likely to in-
clude in their descriptions (and the set of values used):
Hair used 338 times in descriptions including the values:
blond, black, dark/brown, long, tied-back, short, red,
curly, fringe.
Face shape used 162 times in descriptions including the
values: round, oval, small, long, pointed.
Eyebrows used 91 times in descriptions including the val-
ues: heavy/bushy, shaped, dark, groomed, thin.
Nose used 68 times in descriptions including the values:
big, crooked, button/small, long, wide, thin/pointy.
Figure 6 illustrates the verbal description grouping pro-
cess. In selecting the verbal group decoys for face 2, we
would first make a note of all faces described as long. This is
repeated for hair, eyebrows and nose descriptors and scores
are incremented for each matching feature value (and decre-
mented for explicit conflicts). The eight faces with the great-
est tally are used as decoys for the target face. As already
described in a small number of instances we had to use our
own judgement to select decoys where this verbal similarity
ranking did not yield 8 decoys.
Figure 5: Simplified verbal grouping procedure: Ex-
ample tabulation of raw data for a cross-section of
possible facial features. For face 2, all face numbers
occurring on the same row as face 2, for any feature,
are candidate decoys. Faces that occur with face 2
most often are prioritised as decoys. In this example
faces 7 and 8 are the best match.
As a continuation of figures 3.3.1 (random grouping) and
4 (visual grouping); figure 6 shows the decoys for the same
target face in the verbal grouping condition. Though a num-
ber of faces are shared between the visual and verbal groups
there are a notable differences. Indeed, the verbal groups
exhibits significantly more variation in appearance than the
visual group.
Figure 6: Verbal groups: a grid of faces grouped by
verbal similarity (the target face is highlighted).
3.4 Procedure
We recruited 56 participants for controlled trials that took
place during undergraduate computing science practical ses-
sions. Of the 56 participants, 31 were male and 25 female;
none had taken part as contributors in the previous phases.
The average age of participants was 22 (standard deviation
= 7). For each grid, one face was chosen at random as the
target face, with the decoys generated depending on the ex-
perimental condition. A particular face could not be the
target more than once in the same condition.
We also ensured that each description was delivered by a
randomly chosen speaker, reducing dependence on a partic-
ular speaker. In order to study sex differences, we imposed
the additional constraint that participants heard descrip-
tions from speakers that were either all male, or all female
(decided at random upon starting each condition).
Participants were asked to perform all 3 conditions in an
order determined randomly by our software. To provide a
small incentive we offered £5 to participants who were able
to match all five descriptions in any condition.
4. RESULTS
Out of 158 attempts made by participants collectively
across 3 conditions only 13 (8%) of logins were successful,
that is, where the participant correctly associated all 5 ver-
bal descriptions with the target face. Table 2 shows the num-
ber of attempts made in each condition, the male/female
participant split in that group, along with the number of
successful login attempts. Login success was greatest for
the random groups and lowest for the verbal groups. The
average score (out of 5) in the random condition was 3.57
with a standard deviation of 0.91 compared to 2.87 and a
standard deviation of 1.07 in the visually grouped condition
t=3.63 p<0.01. The average score in the verbally grouped
condition was 2.81 with a standard deviation of 1.14. The
difference between the verbal groups condition and the ran-
dom condition was also statistically significant: t=3.64 p <
0.01
Figure 7 shows the distribution of scores across the three
conditions. Scores in the random condition are very much
concentrated about 3 and 4 with 40 of the 54 participants
scoring in this range. This theme of scoring highly was also
reflected in 8 participants achieving 5/5, higher than both
the visual and verbal conditions combined.
The very close result between the visual and verbal con-
ditions warrants further analysis. The shape of the distri-
bution of the visual groups scores is bell shaped with scores
concentrated mainly around 2/5 and 3/5. It is surprising
that 5 more participants scored 4/5 in the verbal condition
than the visual condition, while so few in the verbal condi-
tion scored 5/5. A possible contributing factor being that as
the number of participants in each condition was not overly
large, 8 fewer participants in the verbal condition over the
visual condition did not allow any extremes to even out.
Figure 7: Random vs Visual vs Verbal groups: A
breakdown of the scores achieved in each condition.
Although participants were not placed under time pres-
sure, we measured the time taken to complete each condi-
tion. Our assumption was that participants would take the
least time to complete the random condition due to the au-
dio descriptions appearing less ambiguous. In fact the mean
timings differed little between the three conditions, 155 sec-
onds (standard deviation of 72) for the random groups, 152
seconds (standard deviation of 51) for the visual groups, and
149 seconds (standard deviation 55) for the verbal groups –
there is no statistical significance in the difference.
Table 1 shows the breakdown of successful logins to dis-
play the sex of the participant and the sex of the speakers in
the audio descriptions. Females using female audio descrip-
tions were the most successful, with male listeners using
female descriptions a close second. Despite the small num-
bers this suggests that female descriptions were most useful
when completing this exercise.
Table 1: Sex combinations of describer and listener
for successful login (e.g. M:M = male listener using
male description).
M:M M:F F:M F:F
Random groups 1 0 1 5
Visual groups 1 3 0 1
Verbal groups 0 1 0 0
Table 2: Number of successful logins in the different
experimental conditions.
Condition Attempts Male/Female Successes
Random 54 29/25 8
Visual 56 31/25 4
Verbal 49 26/23 1
4.1 Descriptions
Overall participants associated audio descriptions with
the correct face 62% of the time (482/780). Using male de-
scriptions participants were correct 60% of the time (238/395)
and using female descriptions this figure was 63% (244/385).
Figure 8: Example faces: users performance for dif-
ferent faces varied between extremes.
Some descriptions were clearly more effective than others.
For example, consider the faces shown in figure 8 (actual
examples from our face bank). We expected face (a) to be
easily distinguished as only two faces out of the 18 male
faces had red hair. Indeed, examples of descriptions for face
(a) include:
Description 1: “Big red hair, large forehead.”
Description 2: “Pale skin, ginger hair, almost
smirking rather than smiling.”
Description 3: “Male, ginger hair. Ginger eye-
brows. Uhm, slightly curved eyebrows. Uhm,
broadish nose, head slightly tilted back. Not
smiling so much. Ears showing around the hair-
cut, quite fluffy hair. Can’t see any clothing,
uhm, the way the shot’s taken.”
Though relatively short these description were highly ef-
fective in supporting the identification of the correct face.
Description 1 was used correctly 8 times out of the 8 it was
played to participants. Description 2 and description 3 were
both used correctly 3 times out of the 3 they were heard.
Unlike face (a), face (b) does not have such distinctive fea-
tures and as a result the task of constructing an effective
verbal description is made significantly more difficult. Ex-
ample descriptions for face (b) include:
Description 4: “Female with, straggly <break>
dark <break> brown with slight lighter blondish
<break> highlights or areas within her hair. Tied
back presumably. <break> Looking up in the
corner, slightly chubby face.”
Description 5: “A white female, with her hair
up but some of it coming across her face like two
bits down the side of her face. <break> Uhm
<break> uhm <break> like a brown jumper on
with a bit of a white collar.”
Description 4 was used twice with no correct responses while
description 5 was used three times and also received no cor-
rect responses. Describers of faces (c) and (d) experienced
similar difficulties and the worst performing descriptions in
the experiment were associated with these faces. Descrip-
tions of each of these faces were heard 4 times and resulted
in no correct responses:
Description 6: (face c) “Uh, he’s got blond
short hair, and his eyebrows are quite promi-
nent, quite thick eyebrows, uhm, but also quite
big eyes. Uhm he’s got quite a long face.”
Description 7 (face d): “Uhm, large eyes. Uhm,
long blondy hair. Happy looking.”
Two particularly interesting descriptions were collected
that were very short and relied on participants having a
common understanding of judgements of sexual attractive-
ness:
Description 8: “She’s quite fit” (fit is a British
slang term for attractive)
Description 9: “She’s very average looking”
Unfortunately due to the random selection of descriptions
in the experiment these two descriptions were never heard
by a participant. However, in a small pilot test outside of
the study where a grid was generated using the random de-
coy technique, 4/5 males guessed correctly which female was
“quite fit” whereas 1/5 females were able to guess correctly.
Matching the second description was more difficult as both
male and females matched the correct twice.
4.2 Sex differences
On average females outperformed males with an overall
score of 3.21 vs 2.99 (not significant). However, female per-
formance was more consistent than that of males as dis-
played (see figure 9).
Figure 9: Comparison of male and female perfor-
mance.
The upper tail ratio for female participants either achiev-
ing 4 or 5 is 1.14. This means that for every 100 males
achieving 4 or 5 you would expect 114 females to do the
same. We also noticed trends that females scored better us-
ing female descriptions. Aside from females scoring the most
successful logins using female descriptions, they also per-
formed better overall using female descriptions rather than
male descriptions (3.39 vs. 2.97, t=1.71 p=0.09). Interest-
ingly males performed better using male descriptions rather
than female descriptions 3.04 vs 2.92 (t=0.51 p=0.6) al-
though this was not statistically significant. Females marginally
outperformed males in every condition.
5. DISCUSSION
The results highlighted that in our set-up participants did
indeed find it difficult to use descriptions to login to our sys-
tem, with only 8% doing so successfully. However we believe
this could be a factor of our experimental set-up rather than
being a completely accurate reflection of the phenomenon.
In the descriptions we collected there was such variation in
participants’ ability that a participant could have been hin-
dered in scoring 5/5 by being assigned a description which
to them was not so useful. In this situation a participant
is almost reduced to a random guess. In a set-up incorpo-
rating a two way dialogue between describer and listener we
feel the results would have been more resounding.
Our main contribution has been to demonstrate that de-
scription could be made more difficult by strategic selection
of decoy faces. Participants in the random groups condition
achieved an overall average score of 3.57, compared with 2.87
in the visual groups condition and 2.81 in the verbal groups
condition. As these figures indicate participants performed
best in the random condition, where it was most likely faces
were distinctive enough for descriptions to have maximum
impact. Interestingly there was no significant difference be-
tween performance in the visual group and the verbal group
which suggests each has a similar detrimental effect on the
sharing of Passfaces. Evaluating the impact of these tech-
niques on memorability is the next step.
Real-world implications of future research confirming and
extending these results could involve the similarity of Pass-
faces decoys being adjusted depending on the security con-
text of system deployment. In corporate environments where
password sharing is not desirable, the similarity of decoys to
the target face according to some metric could be increased,
whereas for other contexts this could be relaxed.
While our results did not reveal any significant perfor-
mance differences between male and female participants, it
was interesting to note that females did perform better on
average across all conditions over males. In addition, de-
scriptions created by females tended to include more detail
and be significantly longer in duration than those of male
participants. As such, females performed significantly better
when using female descriptions over those of males. In fact,
the behaviour of both sexes did conform to establish gender
differences, for example, male performance showed a larger
Table 3: Female vs male performance in each exper-
imental condition
Female Male
Random groups 3.72 3.42
Visual groups 2.92 2.83
Verbal groups 2.96 2.68
variance than female performance. In the gender difference
literature [13] it is often noted that due to the greater in-
dividual differences in male performance, more males than
females should be recruited in experiments to gain a better
impression of the extremes of male performance.
One simple technique that could be adopted to make de-
scription of recognition based secrets difficult is for the sys-
tem to vary the order of the challenge images presented to
the user. In this situation the best a describer could do is to
describe all their faces in the hope the listener could identify
with one of the descriptions. We speculate this technique
would be highly prone to error on the part of the listener.
In terms of improvements in experimental design, we are
interested in gaining access to a larger bank of images and
as mentioned previously making future experiments more
socially embedded affairs. For example, by grouping par-
ticipants in pairs, with one describer and one listener. The
describer would remotely communicate the (for example by
telephone) graphical password and the listener would need
to interpret the description to perform the correct action.
This change would permit a two way dialogue to emerge be-
tween each participant to debug ambiguity in descriptions.
Such an experimental setting would give a better indication
of the likely manifestation of graphical password sharing in
the real world.
6. CLOSING REMARKS
Our study has in part demonstrated the degree to which
Passfaces can be verbally described, but also how through
judicious choice of decoys we can reduce the vulnerability
of Passfaces to description. Our empirical study has high-
lighted the reality that contrary to common wisdom users
can share Passfaces graphical passwords. This observation
can very likely be extended to other graphical password
schemes and we would contend that the topic of descrip-
tion warrants levels of investigation on a par with accepted
issues such as interference and shoulder surfing.
We also anticipate that the vulnerability of graphical pass-
word schemes to description could have impact on issues of
both memorability and shoulder surfing. In a related on-
going unpublished study using Passfaces, a large number
of participants have commented on how their memory strat-
egy for their Passfaces comprised memorising verbal descrip-
tions. If decoy faces in Passfaces employed a grouping policy
that means that they were in some way similar to the target
face, it is likely to impact on the ability of a user to select the
target face. Likewise, in a shoulder-surfing scenario where
attackers have a limited amount of time to form a quick
memory association with components of an authentication
secret.
We conducted an informal pilot study using our own im-
plementation of the passpoints [28] system. 5 users abil-
ity to select click points in response to verbal descriptions
were investigated. Figure 10 shows the sample image we
used along with the 5 chosen click points and the order of
these. The experiment involved the listener sitting in front
of a computer screen with our passpoints software loaded.
A male experiment moderator stood behind the participant
and described the location of each click point in turn. No
gesticulation was allowed and descriptions were not permit-
ted to include reference to the current position of the mouse
pointer, only points on the image. The listener was allowed
to request more information or clarification to which the de-
scriber could respond. The results of this pilot study showed
4 out of 5 participants were able to correctly interpret the
descriptions into the correct sequence of click points.
Figure 10: Passpoints description study.
In ongoing work we are investigating the vulnerability of
other graphical password schemes to description, and the im-
plications of this on users’ authentication experience. Image
selection schemes such as Story [7] and VIP [8] use images
representing very different themes and are likely to be easily
described based on the content alone. Schemes such as De´ja`
Vu [9] in part aim to explicitly address description, yet the
computer generated random art yields unique images. Thus
De´ja` Vu may admit description via the very distinctive fea-
tures that are intended to guarantee its immunity. Similarly,
Draw-a-Secret (DAS) [15] drawings are likely to be easy to
record on paper, using sketches that can be readily supple-
mented with pointers indicating where to start each stroke.
Furthermore, in relation to verbal description it seems likely
that techniques could be developed to communicate DAS
drawings.
In an alphanumeric password setting users are typically
forbidden to write down and share passwords. However,
conventional passwords are so well suited to this type of
distribution that users are able to share them with anyone
they please. Though this is not necessarily undesirable, if
system administrators do not wish users to write down and
share passwords they might use a scheme which by its very
nature mitigates against the sharing and external recording
of authentication secrets. Indeed, as we better understand
the nature of password description, the ability to write down
and describe secrets might in future be incorporated as an
explicit selection criteria for authentication schemes.
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9. APPENDIX
A number of faces from the facebank and descriptions:
Female: This girl looks quite young, she’s got
uhm dark hair that looks as though she’s had high-
lights in but it’s on the whole very dark. Uhm,
she’s a uhm, got dark eyes and sort of quite heavy
eyebrows again. Sort of pronounced chin this girl.
She looks quite friendly, her forehead’s quite big
and her cheeks quite pink.
Female: uhm <break> smiling a little bit shyly.
Uhm, she’s got dark brown hair hanging loosely
probably in a long bob along her face, centre part-
ing again, no fringe. Probably quite slim. <break>
Winona Ryder type if I had to describe her like
anybody.
Male: White female, sort of light brown to red-
dish hair. Long. Uhm, wideish mouth, quite tanned,
dark eyes <break> square head. Prettyish.
Male: Fairly attractive woman with long brown
hair.
Female: Uhm, he’s got short, dark hair that’s
quite closely cropped and very prominent dark
eyebrows, uhm, they’re quite long as well. Uhm
<break> when he smiles he’s got quite a big smile
that kind of transforms the rest of his face. Uhm
<break> he also has, uhm, either quite dark jaw
line, uhm, when he doesn’t shave, oh, he’s got
stubble as well. Uhm, and he looks, uhm, he looks
quite surprised.
Female: White male with short <break> brown
black hair. Very thick eyebrows. Uhm, quite smily,
quite cheeky smile. Uhm, got a black jumper that
kinda collars up which is, I think, black or brown.
<break> and he’s got quite a small smile. And
<break> he’s got quite a heart shaped face.
Male: Male with slightly eccentric smile on his
face. Has rather dark, busy eyebrows. Has, some,
slight, moustache and beard stubble going on. And
has a rather pointed chin.
Male: Uhm, big chin, bit of facial hair going on.
Wide open eyes. Big bushy eyebrows. Uhm, sort
of long thinish face.
Female: Here’s another cheery looking girl with
slightly reddish face and slightly shiny brow. She’s
got dark blonde hair which is hanging loose from
her centre parting. <break> Uhm, dark brown
eyes.
Female: Uhm, this girl look, uhm, she has ex-
pensive hair, actually, sort of quite blond but sort
of looks like it’s been done nicely. She has a nice
smile.
Male: Fairly attractive woman with long brown
hair.
Male: Uhm, <break> girl, brownish hair, quite
tanned. Nice smile. Uhm, normalish eyes, normal
eyebrows.
Female: He’s got very neat, short dark, very dark
hair. Uhm, quite a low, wears his hair, style, uhm,
which is quite low over his forehead. Uhm, per-
haps quite a low hairline. And he’s got very promi-
nent dark eyebrows that do very long, is actually
one side of his face to the other, really. Uhm, he’s
got, uhm, very slight mustache. Uhm, and when
he smiles he doesn’t, his teeth don’t show. Uhm,
and he looks quite young as well like he doesn’t,
uhm, the fact that he, uhm, he has quite a youth-
ful complexion also she’s got quite slightly tanned
skin.
Female: Okay, this one’s, uhm, a man. He’s got
short, very dark brown hair that looks like its got
some curl to it. Huge bushy eyebrows. Uhm, dark
brown eyes and a bit of stubble where a mustache
could grow but not on the rest of his chin. He’s
got quite full lips. Uhm <break> and he looks
he’s got an European kind of Italian or Spanish
colouring to his skin, or a sun tan. Uhm, he’s got
quite a wide nose at the bottom of his nose but
the bridge of his nose is quite narrow. Uhm.
Male: Boy. Laughing without showing his teeth.
Looking straight ahead, thick eyebrows.
Male: Male with, very thick dark black hair. Very
strong hairline. Has dark bushy eyebrows and
slight moustache stubble.
Female: Uhm, <break> a blonde young woman,
with a quite hesitant look about her. She’s got her
hair tied back and there’s <break> little bits com-
ing down the sides. <break> Scarf tied around her
neck.
Female: Okay, she’s a girl and she’s got kind of
longish blonde hair, looks as though it’s been high-
lighted, so. Uhm, quite straggly wearing a scarf.
Uhm, looks quite friendly. Uhm, got her hair tied
back. That’s about it really.
Female: She’s got blonde hair. Uhm, quite a wide
open face, quite pretty. <break> UhmEˇ
Male: Okay, female, uhm, sort of longish, uhm,
darkish blonde hair with a some sort of yellow top
and some sort of whiteish collar. Erm. <break>
I don’t know, slightly long chin <laughs>.
Male: Female, blonde, dark eyes, thick red lips.
<break> Round face, good skin
Male: Er, blonde woman, quite quite sticky out
chin. Big lips, quite attractive
Female: He’s got, uhm, hair that come down to
his jaw line, uhm, it’s quite thick hair almost like
a girl would wear in a bob. Uhm, he’s got, he’s
not smiling a great deal but even he’s got quite a
small mouth as well, he’s got dark eyes which are
quite prominent, uhm, and quite, uhm, a reddy
pink complexion as well.
Female: Okay, the next one’s a man. Uhm <break>
he’s got quite <break> an oval face, quite a pointy
chin <break> he’s got brown hair cut down to his,
uhm, chin. It’s quite, a bit wavy a bit unkept.
<break> Uhm, he’s got a small mouth <break>.
He’s got brown eyes and quite bushy eyebrows.
Uhm <break> he’s got quite a wide face, and a
bit of a vacant look about him in this picture.
Female: White male. Uhm, chin length brown
brown hair that’s quite wavy. Uhm <break> he’s
got a brown jumper on. Uhm.
Male: A boy with long brown hair. A small smile
on his face. Wide coloured face.
Male: Male with <break> chin length, slightly
unkept, dark brown hair, long dark brown hair.
Ovalish square type face.
Male: Uhm, first thing to notice is the hair. Uhm
<break> quite big open eyes, uhm, <break> again
face isn’t symmetrical, uhm ,<break> first thing
to notice is the hair. The mouth, not much of a
defined jaw line, cheek bones or anything like that
Female: Blond woman, smiling cheerfully straight
at the camera. Her hair’s tied back as well. She’s
got quite an open look to her, face. Rosy cheeks.
Nice smile.
Female: She’s got, her hair scraped back, quite a
large chin, quite pretty, quite a large nose, looks a
lot like Jo from S Club 7.
Female: Okay she looks quite friendly. She’s got
her hair tied back. Blondish by the look of things.
Nice, uhm, showing her teeth so she looks though
she’s very friendly with sort of pale white skin and
kinda wearing a scarf, looks refined.
Male: Female, round face, uhm, wide chin, dark
eyes, brown hair, blonde highlights.
Male: Erm, female, uhm, combed back sort of
hair, wearing some sort of dark scarf. <break>Err
<break> Sort of a slightly broader bottom of the
face, with showing her teeth grinning.
Female: He’s got dark hair, sorry brown hair, it’s
not really very dark. It’s quite spiky at the top,
it’s short. Uhm, he’s got kinda a ready complex-
ion, very nice smile, laughing eyes, uhm, he’s got
a pointed chin but his features are quite close to-
gether.
Female: Happy looking guy. <break> Short brown
hair. <break> A bit messed up at the top of his
hair.
Male: Uhm, white, uhm, kinda pinkish, probably
British. Uhm, kinda spike hair. Uhm, short at the
sides. Uhm, quite prominent smile. Uhm, pointed
nose. Ears slightly sticking out. And rounded eye-
brows, sort of like brown eyes.
Male: It’s a, man, with, brown, quite short hair.
It’s shorter at the sides than at the top. Uhm,
quite small eyes, and <break> clean shaven. Quite
broad mouth. <break> Possibly a pointy nose. I
think I said quite small eyes.
Male: Male. Fluffy brown hair on the top cut
short at the top. Brown eyebrows, curved. Smil-
ing face, uhm, although not particularly smiling.
Slightly flushed looking cheeks. Uhm, pointed chin.
Dark eyes. And, uhm.
Female: Chinese or Taiwanese girl. Smiling, slightly.
Erm, looking full face sort of onto to me with her
dark hair tied back, middle, uhm, side-parting,
sorry. <break> Just looking down slightly but
still looking right at me.
Female:She look quite young. She’s got short,
dark hair. Nice eyes, nice eyeshadow. Uhm, she
looks young. I think she’s, sort of Asian. Round
face, and hair is short and dark, with a severe
parting.
Female: Okay, this girl has either got, uhm, quite
short hair or it is tied back. Oriental with, uhm,
brown eyes and very dark hair. Smiling, doesn’t
look desperately friendly, but I think it’s just the
camera in front of her.
Male: Uhm, female, uhm, slightly Oriental look-
ing, dark hair, comb parting on the left hand side,
uhm, wearing some sort of white top.
Male: Uhm, female dark eyes, dark hair, Asian
origin, uhm <break>, round face, round chin.
Male: Er, female, Asian origin, dark hair.
Female: She’s got long blonde hair, uhm, it’s not
really light blonde, it’s sort of dark blonde. She’s
got a middle parting. She’s again smiling. She’s
got quite a reddy complexion, sort of healthy look-
ing. She’s got, prominent cheek bones. <break>
Uhm <break> probably dark eyes. A longish straight
nose. Uhm <break> quite a big chin, perhaps.
And that’s about it, I think.
Female: Girl with a parting slightly to the side.
Her hair is long <break> but she’s got <break>
dark eyes. Colour in her face and <break> her
hair grows past her shoulders.
Male: Uhm, pink skin. Uhm <break> blonde
fair hair. Looks very long. Uhm, straight, centre
parting. Uhm, quite prominent cheek bones.
Male: Uhm, it’s a woman with, quite a, quite a
square, look at the top of her hair, sorry head.
There are tapers at the bottom. Uhm, hair is sort
of brown but it’s almost yellow, uhm, not blonde
but yellow. Uhm, and quite a pronounced fore-
head, uhm, with a parting in the middle. Uhm,
blue eyes, I think. Uhm, <break> and <break>
quite pronounced cheeks.
Male: Blonde female. Uhm, wavy hair. Going
down past the shoulders. Uhm, slightly curved
eyebrows, smiling. Uhm, tanned complexion, maybe.
And, uhm, maybe highlights in the blonde hair.
Uhm, quite big dark eyes and a, uhm, curved face
with a high forehead.
